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Abstract
We present a model of asset valuation in which short-selling is
achieved by searching for security lenders and by bargaining over the
terms of the lending fee. If lendable securities are dicult to locate,
then the price of the security is initially elevated, and expected to
decline over time. This price decline is to be anticipated, for exam-
ple, after an initial public oering (IPO), among other cases, and is
increasing in the degree of heterogeneity of beliefs of investors about
the likely future value of the security. The initial price of a security
may be above even the most optimistic buyer’s valuation of the secu-
rity’s future dividends, because of the additional prospect of lending
fees for owners.
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1 Introduction
The common method of shorting an equity or a xed-income security is to
borrow the security and sell it. Later, one would buy it in order to return it
to the lender, proting by any price decline, net of borrowing fees. In some
cases, on which we focus, it may be dicult to locate securities available for
lending.
We build a dynamic model of the determination of prices, lending fees,
and short interest (the quantity of securities held short). Agents trade be-
cause of dierences of opinions, and would-be shorters must search for secu-
rity lenders and bargain over the lending fee.
We provide a closed-form equilibrium solution, including the dynamics of
the price, of the lending fees, and of the short interest. The price is elevated
by the prospect of future lending fees, and may, in the beginning, be even
higher than the valuation of the most optimistic agent.1 As time passes, the
short interest increases and the prospective fees from future loans decrease.
The private valuation of the marginal investor simultaneously declines. Both
eects imply that the price declines.
As opposed to the rather conflicted literature relating the current level
of short interest to expected returns,2 our model suggests that price declines
can be more directly related to changes in the short interest over time. For
example, a rapid buildup in the short interest signals strong un-met shorting
demand, an associated high lending fee, and thus, other things equal, that
lower-than-normal expected returns will suce to incent a given investor to
hold the security. As the short interest grows over time, moreover, the long
interest grows one for one, so a rapid increase in short interest implies a rapid
succession of purchases by less and less optimistic buyers, and associated
reductions in price. The price is not reduced one for one with the change of
valuation by the marginal investor, however, since this change is anticipated
by agents. Further, in judging expected returns, one must take care as to
1Harrison and Kreps (1978) and Morris (1996) obtain a similar result, but due to the
opportunity to speculate.
2See Aitken, Frino, McCorry, and Swan (1998), Asquith and Meulbroek (1996), Brent,
Morse, and Stice (1990), Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan (2000), Figlewski (1981),
Figlewski andWebb (1993), MacDonald and Baron (1973), Saeddine andWilhelm (1996),
Seneca (1967), and Woolridge and Dickinson (1994). Senchack and Starks (1993) do
consider changes, but only in as much as they take as proxies for the unexpected amount
of shorting.
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whose probability assessments are considered, because of our assumption of
heterogeneous expectations. These points are claried in the context of our
model.
Our theoretical model is consistent with the empirical results of Jones
and Lamont (2001), who nd that, for NYSE stocks during the period 1926-
1933, those that have high lending fees, that is, low rebate rates, tend to
have inferior average returns.
Our results suggest explanations for several asset-pricing peculiarities.
For instance, our model is consistent with low average returns during the
period immediately following an initial public oering (IPO), when the het-
erogeneity of investors’ expectations may be highest, and the quantity of
shares available for lending may be relatively low, especially until the expi-
ration of lock-up agreements, which contractually delay insider sales.3 Like-
wise, our model is consistent with the observation of Geczy, Musto, and Reed
(2001) that lending fees are relatively high immediately after an IPO, and
on average decline over time, as the float increases. The presence of special
(low-rebate) securities lending, on its own, could account for a substantial
adverse impact on conventional measures of IPO returns. From Figure 1 of
Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2001), for example, the cumulative eect of low-
rebate securities lending for the rst six months after an IPO, on average
over their sample, amounts to approximately 0.75% of the market value of
the underlying equities.4 This implies that an investor who could be assured
of placing purchased shares immediately into lending agreements would be
willing to accept an average reduction of approximately 1.5% in annualized
expected return over the rst six months, when considering an alternative
investment of the same type, but not on special. (This assumes that random
variation in the rebate special is unsystematic and thus carries no risk pre-
mium.) While there are in fact delays in arranging lending agreements, and
this is one of the points of our paper, this suggests an impact of securities
lending fees on the expected returns demanded of IPOs that is not to be
ignored when judging IPO performance in the secondary market.
Although they do not address IPOs specically, Jones and Lamont (2001)
suggest that lending fees are insucient on their own to account for the low
3Evidence for long-run IPO underperformance is provided by Ritter (1991), Loughran
and Ritter (1995), and others, but has been questioned by Brav, Geczy, and Gompers
(2000) and Eckbo and Norli (2001).
4This is based on the information plotted in their gure, and approximate. We do not
have the underlying numerical data.
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average performance of stocks on special, for their 1926-1933 NYSE data set.
Furthermore, our model may help resolve the puzzling price behavior of
certain equity carve-outs. For instance, Lamont and Thaler (2001), Mitchell,
Pulvino, and Staord (2001), and Ofek and Richardson (2001) point to
spinos in which the stub value (the implied market value of the portion
of the parent company that is not spun o) can be initially negative, seem-
ingly inconsistent with limited liability and optimizing behavior by agents.
A recent extreme example is the spino of Palm by 3Com. We show that
extremely small or even negative stub values are implied if two groups of in-
vestors hold opposite and complementary views about both the spino and
the stub, and if lendable shares are suciently hard to locate. In accordance
with our model’s predictions, stub values typically increase over time, while
lending fees diminish.
An informal explanation of IPO \underperformance" as a consequence
of heterogeneous beliefs and imperfect shorting abilities was suggested by
Miller (1977). This eect was modeled by Figlewski (1981), Lintner (1969),
and Jarrow (1980) in a static CAPM framework, assuming an exogenously
given transactions cost or restriction on shorting.5 More recently, some static
models (D’Avolio (2001) in the context of equities, and Due (1996) and Kr-
ishnamurthy (2001) for treasuries) have directly considered a market equilib-
rium for lending fees. By considering behavior over time, our model captures
additional intuition for the determination of prices and lending fees. For in-
stance, our model makes it apparent that lending fees (and the price) reflect
the expected number of times that a particular share is to be lent, and clarify
the roles paid by the float and by the capital available for shorting.
We show that a higher float, other things equal, implies lower lending
fees and prices, at all times, since it makes shorting easier and hastens the
decrease of the marginal investor’s valuation and of the future potential per-
ceived gains from trade.6 Larger dierences of opinions, on the other hand,
imply larger (perceived) gains from a lending agreement, whence larger lend-
ing fees.
5Viswanathan (2001) allows for strategic behavior in such a setting. Williams (1977)
developed a dynamic heterogeneous-beliefs model. Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) provide
empirical support based on evidence of dispersion of beliefs. Harrison and Kreps (1978)
and Morris (1996) illustrate the speculative opportunities that arise with heterogeneous
beliefs and shorting restrictions. Allen, Morris, and Postlewaite (1993) model \bubbles"
in the presence of asymmetric information with short-sales constraints.
6D’Avolio (2001) nds a similar result, which stems from risk aversion.
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We also enrich our basic model by endogenizing the amount of shorting
capital, showing that, other things equal, more capital is brought to bear
on shorting in settings with greater dierences of opinions between optimists
and pessimists. Further, we show that settlement lags can have signicant
impacts on short interest, lending fees, and prices.
Our model does not address the manner in which information revelation
is suppressed by short-sale costs or other shorting constraints, as modeled by
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), nor do we consider the potential impact of
derivatives trading (which may be viewed as alternatives to shorting, when
shorting is costly or constrained), empirically investigated by Jennings and
Starks (1986) Skinner (1990), and Senchack and Starks (1993).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section pro-
vides a description of the institutional features of the markets for securities
lending and shorting. Section 3 provides the model, including a characteriza-
tion of the equilibrium, comparative statics, and a treatment of the impact
of delayed settlement. Section 4 applies the model to the behavior of the
prices of spinos relative to their parent rms, as in the case of Palm and
3Com. Appendix A shows, as a benchmark, that, without frictions, the
unique equilibrium lending fee is zero. Proofs are in Appendix B.
2 The Market for Securities Lending
In a typical securities lending transaction, a would-be shorter, such as a hedge
fund, would request a \locate" from its broker. The broker might locate the
stock in its own inventory, or in the accounts of those of its customers permit-
ting the use of their securities for lending. Failing this, the broker could turn
to a custodian bank, or to another potential lender. Natural lenders include
institutional investors such as insurance companies, index funds, and pension
funds, who tend to have large and long-duration buy-and-hold investments.
Brokers may even have exclusive contracts with institutional investors for
access to portfolios of securities for lending purposes, as in a recent major
exclusive lending deal between CSFB and CalPERS.7 The broker’s search for
7On November 3, 2000, CSFB oered the following press release. \Credit Suisse First
Boston (CSFB), in the largest deal of its type, announced today that it has been selected
by the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) to be an exclusive
securities lending principal borrower for CalPERS’ passively managed Wilshire 2500 and
small-cap stock portfolios totaling more than $57 billion in equity assets. In this arrange-
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lendable securities might be conducted using an electronic locate system, or
by email, fax, or telephone. On May 22, 2001, ten large nancial institutions
announced the formation of Equilend, an automatic multi-broker lending fa-
cility. (Notably, CSFB was not one of the ten initial participating rms.) A
Financial Times reporter8 outlining the proposed role of Equilend described
traditional methods for brokering shorts as \labor-intensive, because the ap-
propriate shares or securities can take time to locate."
When encountering stocks that are \hard to locate," brokers sometimes
cannot \circle" the quantity of lendable shares requested. Brokers may oer
\partial lls." Occasionally, a signicant amount of time may pass before
the necessary stock can be located. (Unfortunately, we do not have data
concerning the distribution of time delays for locating lendable stocks.) Fac-
tors that are said to be related to the degree of diculty of locating lendable
shares include the capitalization of the issue, the float (the quantity of shares
available for trade), whether the stock is included in an index, the stock’s liq-
uidity, the degree of concentration of ownership, and the presence of special
activity, such as IPOs, mergers, spinos, or acquisitions.
Once a security is located, the broker may execute a \pay-for-hold" trans-
action, compensating the lender for holding the securities until the borrower
executes a short sale. This transaction is sometimes called \pre-borrowing."
Trades in the stock itself are normally executed in the U.S. within 3 days
of the trade. Normally, sell orders that are short sales are marked \short"
ment, CalPERS has given CSFB the exclusive right to borrow the assets held in each of
the portfolios for a guaranteed fee. ‘The combination of CalPERS and CSFB in this se-
curities lending relationship will give the System’s members superior value for their assets
while allowing CSFB to continue expanding its Equity Finance franchise,’ said Bob Sloan,
Managing Director of the global Equity Finance Group at CSFB. ‘This places CSFB in
a position to further our franchise in the prime brokerage and alternative capital arena,’
he continued. ‘We are very pleased CalPERS has selected CSFB.’ : : : eSecLending pro-
vided the platform for distributing bidding parameters and guidelines to participating
broker/dealers and disseminating bidding results to CalPERS for execution. eSecLend-
ing, LLC, (www.eseclending.com), is a new rm oering a web-based auction system for
securities lending. The new process is designed to meet the needs of large pension funds,
mutual funds and other major investors including online custodians. Burlington, Vt.-
based eSecLending serves as the primary developer of the web platform and software, and
is responsible for stang and managing the auction process." (Source: www.csfb.com)
The term \portfolio valuation" has apparently been used by brokers for the valuation of
such exclusive lending rights. We are not aware of the fee in the CALPERS-CSFB deal.
8See \Banks Form Platform for Short-Sellers," by Alex Skorecki, Financial Times, May
22, 2001.
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for special attention, because they may be executed only on an \uptick," an
SEC regulation.
The actual securities-lending transaction, given a locate, can be accom-
plished on a same-day basis. If conducted through a broker, the broker would
typically act as the borrower from the outside lender, and as the lender to the
outside borrower. Cash collateral, normally 102% of the market value of the
borrowed shares for domestic securities (105% for international securities),
is passed from the borrower to the lender in exchange for the shares. The
lender \rebates" interest on the collateral at an agreed overnight rate. An
overnight rebate rate of r implies a daily interest payment of r=360 times the
amount of cash collateral. The interest payments may accrue on a daily ba-
sis, for month-end settlement. The rebate oered by the broker to its outside
borrower would normally be lower than the rebate received by the broker
from its outside lender. The extent to which the rebate is below a market
rate (such as the federal funds rate in the United States) represents a benet
to the lender over other sources of funding. Occasionally, other securities are
used as collateral, rather than cash, in which case an outright lending fee is
charged. Only 1% of the security loans by a custodian bank appearing in the
database analysed by Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2001) were of this type.
Under SEC Regulation T, retail customers of brokers must, in addition to
the cash collateral, post 50% of the market value of the stock in additional col-
lateral, although this additional collateral may be posted in Treasury Bills.9
Shorting retail customers typically do not receive any interest on their cash
collateral, and retail customers whose stocks are being lent typically do not
benet from any lending fee.
In this paper we focus (implicitly) on institutional investors. One of the
purposes of this paper is to model and present-value the stream of low-rebate
benets to owners of lendable shares.
Lending agreements are normally on an \open" or \continuing" basis,
renewed each day with an adjustment of the cash collateral according to
changes in the market price of the stock, and at a newly negotiated rebate
9Maintenance margin is 30%, or $5 per share, whichever is greater. Investors may short
a stock that they already own, a practice called \shorting against the box," for example
in order to create the eective reduction in equity exposure associated with a direct sale,
but avoid immediate recognition of capital gains for tax purposes. The additional margin
required when shorting against the box is only 5%, according to Brent, Morse, and Stice
(1990). Retail customers may in some cases post the 150% in cash collateral with no
rebate.
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rate. The lender may opt out of a continuing lending arrangement by issuing
a \recall notice," in which case the borrower must return the stock. A typical
method for the short-seller to return the stock would be to borrow it from
another lender. Alternatively, the borrower’s broker could issue its own recall
notice to another borrower. In some cases, often called \short squeezes,"
the borrower (or its broker) is unable to locate lendable shares and must
be \bought in," that is, must buy the stock outright.10 If the borrower
fails to deliver the security in standard settlement time, the lender itself
may buy it, using the cash collateral. The borrower remains responsible
for any additional costs to the lender in conducting the buy-in. With a
buy-in, the short sale is eectively interrupted. Institutional investors are
viewed as preferred lenders, as they tend to hold stock positions over long
periods of time, and are relatively unlikely to recall the stock. An unrelated
broker, however, would normally be a less desirable lender, as its motives for
maintaining a position in the stock over time are relatively uncertain.
During a lending agreement, ownership title (including voting rights and
rights to any distributions, including dividends and shares) passes to the
borrower.11 Cash-in-lieu-of-dividend payments are made by the borrower to
the lender.
In addition to borrowing for the purpose of proting from a price decline
or to obtain securities to deliver under a prior lending agreement, stocks
may also be borrowed in order to hedge an investment (such as an equity
derivative or a convertible bond), to gain access to voting rights, or to be
the owner of record for dividends, which can be useful for certain accounting
or tax reasons, or for dividend-discount reinvestment plan purchases, the
benets of which are documented by Scholes and Wolfson (1989).
Shares are lent in order to obtain the cash collateral as a source of -
nancing, and in order to prot from the associated low rebates, or to meet
the terms of an exclusive lending agreement, in return for which the lender
received a guaranteed fee, as in the CSFB-CalPERS deal.
10A broker might, as a service to a highly valued customer, buy the stock on its own
account in order to lend it to the customer.
11In Japan, given the Japanese tax treatment of dividends, it is common for the lender
to recall the stock prior to dividends, in order to be recognized as the holder of record.
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3 Securities Lending and Asset Pricing
This section contains the basic model, based on trade among agents with
divergent beliefs about the prospective future value of an asset. Optimists
want to buy the asset; pessimists want to sell it short. The key features of this
model are: (i) an agent can sell shares only if he owns them or has borrowed
them, (ii) those wishing to borrow or lend must search for each other, and
(iii) the borrower and lender must negotiate a fee. Our valuation approach
is based on Due, Ga^rleanu, and Pedersen (2000), which has a search-and-
baragaining structure similar to that earlier used in certain monetary models,
particularly Trejos and Wright (1995).
3.1 Model
Our model addresses a hypothetical asset that pays no dividends before a
stopping time  with Poisson arrival intensity12 γ. At time  , the present
market value V of the future dividends is revealed to all agents.13 Before this
\day of reckoning," no information concerning V is revealed. Of the total
amount of shares outstanding, the float (amount of actual shares available
for trade) is xed at F . We could also examine the implications of scheduled
changes in the float over time, for example through expiration of lock-up
agreements, or through merger or spino events.
We assume for simplicity that agents are risk-neutral and show no time
preference. A continuum of types of agents, indexed by  2 [0; 1], agree
on the probability distribution of the time  at which V is revealed and on
the independence of  and V . They may, however, have dierent beliefs
about the eventual value, V , of the asset. Specically, at any time t <  , an
agent of type  expects the value of the asset to be V  = E(V ), where E
denotes expectation with respect to the probability measure used by agents
of type . The agent types are assumed to be ordered so that, without loss
of generality, V  is strictly increasing in . For example, agents of type 1 are
the most optimistic; agents of type 0 are the most pessimistic. The masses
of the dierent types of agents is given by a measure , in that there is a
12We x a probability space (Ω;F ;P) and a ltration fFt : t  0g of sub--algebras,
satisfying the usual conditions as dened by Protter (1990), representing the information
commonly available to investors. The stopping time  is exponentially distributed with
mean 1=γ.
13That is, V is an F -measurable random variable.
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nite mass ([a; b]) of agents with a type in an interval14 [a; b].
As a simplication, we assume that each agent can be long or short at
most one share. (This may be viewed as an un-modeled substitute for a
risk or credit limit, or for the eect of risk aversion.) Trading of the asset
takes place as follows. There is a centralized (Walrasian) market for buying
and selling shares. At each time t, shares can be bought and sold instantly
at a price Pt. In Section 3.7, we consider the quantitative signicance of
incorporating a settlement lag, normally 3 days in the United States, and
more in most other countries. (Major brokers in Switzerland obtain same-
day settlement.)
In equilibrium, the price Pt clears the market. An agent can sell stock,
however, if and only if he owns it or has borrowed it. In order to borrow a
share, an agent must rst nd another agent who owns a share that can be
lent. Once contact with the lending agent is made, the parties must agree
on a borrowing fee before the loan can be executed.
We assume that agents are randomly matched with intensity . That
is, given a group of agents with mass m, a particular agent nds someone
from that group with intensity m=2, and someone from that group nds
that agent with intensity m=2, for a total contact intensity for that agent
of m. This assumption is based, informally at this stage, on an application
of the law of large numbers for a \continuum" of agents that is typical in
models based on random matching. (Using independent matching, this can
be formally justied by taking limits as the number n of agents goes to +1,
with equally-likely probability of meeting a particular agent, given a contact.
We defer a more careful measure-theoretic treatment of this idealized limiting
behavior to other work.) Similarly, agents from a subset of agents of current
mass mA(t) come into contact with agents from a subset of current mass
mB(t) at the total (almost sure) rate mA(t)mB(t). Our model is equivalent
to one in which borrowers nd other agents with some intensity B < ,
while lenders nd other agents with intensity L =  − B. In this sense,
borrowers are more eective at searching than are lenders if B > L, but our
quantitative results depend only on the total contact intensity  = B + L.
When an agent wishing to short meets an owner of shares, they bargain
over the current rate Rt at which borrowing fees are paid. These fees are
continually re-negotiated until either side terminates the contract, so that
the total fee paid during an open lending agreement between times s and
14The only measurability requirement we have is that intervals are measurable.
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t is
R t
s
Ru du. (The integral make senses if the borrowing-fee process R is
integrable, which is the case in the equilibria that we analyse.) As there is
no time preference, credit risk, or risk aversion, if loans were oered in our
model, then the market interest rate would be zero, so we can also view Rt
as the \special," that is, the dierence between the rebate and the normal
short-term interest rate.
For now, we characterize equilibria in which only \pessimists," meaning
agents of the lowest-valuation type  = 0, can short. In Section 3.6, we show
that this restriction is without loss of generality provided there are frictional
transactions costs for shorting and a suciently large mass of pessimists.
3.2 General Properties of Equilibrium
In this section we derive some general features of the securities lending market
and its interplay with the market for the underlying security.
We assume that, at time zero, the short interest is zero, that is, no short-
ing has yet happened. Because of the Walrasian market for shares, the float
is initially allocated to the most optimistic agents, that is, to a mass F of
agents whose valuations are at least as high as that of any agent not initially
allocated shares.
Over time, pessimists meet lenders, borrow shares, and shortsell. These
shares are bought by successively less optimistic agents. At time t, shares
are bought by the current \marginal investors," the most optimistic investors
who do not already own shares. We are looking for the equilibrium price
process, P (t), the equilibrium borrowing fee, R(t), and the equilibrium short
interest, S(t) (the total amount of shares held short). We may take the
commonly available information at time t to be that generated by prices,
rebates, revelation of V , and by the times of borrower-lender contacts.15
At time t, the total long interest is F+S(t), and therefore the next buyer’s
(marginal investor’s) type (t) is well dened as (t) = (S(t)), where16
(S) = inff : ([; 1])  F + Sg: (1)
15This means that the information set Ft is that generated by fPs; Rs; V 1fsg; 1fsg :
 2 ; s  tg, where  is the set of times at which identied pairs of agents make contact.
In the equilibria that we examine, each agent cares only about observation of ; V; and
that agent’s own contact times.
16If the cumulative distribution function of types is strictly increasing and continuous,
then the condition ([(S); 1]) = F + S uniquely denes (S).
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As of time t, the quantity U(S(t)) of un-lled shorters, that is, the quan-
tity of pessimists who have not already obtained a short position, is
U(S(t)) = (0)− S(t);
the total number of pessimists less the short interest.
The rate S 0(t) at which the short interest S(t) is building up over time de-
pends on the rate of contact between un-lled shorters and owners of stocks.
This total rate of contact is the product of the meeting intensity , the mass
U(S(t)) of unlled shorters, and the float F . Thus,
S 0(t) = FU(S(t))1fF+S(t)<((0;1])g: (2)
The indicator factor 1fF+S(t)<((0;1])g allows for the cessation of shorting once
all optimists already own shares. This ordinary dierential equation (2)
determines the equilibrium short interest S(t) and, together with (1), the
equilibrium allocation of the security.
We model the price P (t) and borrowing fee R(t) that apply in the event
that t <  . The actual price and borrowing fee jump to V and 0, respec-
tively, on date  . We analyze only equilibria in which P (t) and R(t) are
deterministic.
Since, in equilibrium, a lending agreement is not terminated before the
day  of reckoning, the total expected future lending fee Lt from an already-
matched borrower to the lender, from any time t <  onwards, using the fact
that P( > u j  > t) = e−(u−t)γ ; is
Lt = Et
Z 
t
Ru du

=
Z 1
t
Rue
−(u−t)γ du; (3)
where Et denotes expectation given the information available at time t. (This
expectation does not depend on type.) The expected total income, at any
time t before  , associated with eventually lending the stock, once a borrower
is located, is
Lt =
Z 1
t
e−(s−t)γe−
∫ s
t
U(S(u)) duU(S(s))L(s) ds; (4)
using the fact that e−
∫ s
t
U(S(u)) duU(S(s)) is the conditional density, eval-
uated at time s, of the rst time at which a given owner encounters some
un-matched pessimist, given no such contact by time t. The lending deal will
12
be conducted at time s only if V remains un-revealed at that time, explaining
the factor P( > s j  > t) = e−(s−t)γ .
At any time t <  , an (optimistic) agent of type  who has not already
bought the security has an expected benet from buying at some time u  t
of
E
(
(V + Lu − Pu)1fu<g
 t <  = (V  + Lu − Pu) e−(u−t)γ : (5)
By the denition of the time-tmarginal-investor type (t), it must be optimal
for this type to be ready to buy for the rst time at time t. For this to be the
case, the marginal benet to this type of waiting, in terms of price reduction
net of foregone lending fees, must be equal at time t to the marginal cost
of waiting, in terms of the expected rate of loss for this type caused by not
having purchased the asset in time to have proted from the expected price
change at the day of reckoning, time  . This expected opportunity-loss rate
is the mean arrival rate γ of the revelation of V , multiplied by the mean
expected gain V (t) + L(t) − P (t) given prior purchase. That is, we must
have the rst-order condition
d
dt
[L(t)− P (t)] = γ[V (t) + L(t)− P (t)]; (6)
which, is also obtained from (5) by dierentiation with respect to u, eval-
uating the result at u = t and at  = (t), and nally setting the result
equal to zero. We can treat (6) as a linear ordinary dierential equation in
L(t)− P (t), with the solution given by the following result.
Proposition 1 In any equilibrium, the price and expected lending fee from
a prospective fee satisfy
Pt = Lt +
Z 1
t
V (u)e−(u−t)γγ du: (7)
The price, P , can therefore be viewed as the expected future revenue L
associated with the potential to lend the asset, plus the weighted average of
the valuations of future marginal investors, where the weight for type (u)
is the probability density e−(u−t)γγ that this investor will be marginal just as
V is revealed.
This provides a natural relationship between the price, P , and the ex-
pected potential lending fee, L. In order to identify the price and lending fee
separately, one must treat the bargaining game between the borrower and
the lender.
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3.3 Negotiating the Lending Fee
In this section, we model the negotiation of the lending fee. We consider a
potential lender and borrower who have made contact and must agree on a
lending fee. To determine the relative strength of their bargaining positions,
we rst determine their outside options.
If the lender walks away from the negotiations at time t, he expects (in
equilibrium) a present value of lending fees of Lt from the next borrower,
which is thus his outside option value. Similarly, the borrower’s outside
option value at time t is the expected value associated with nding another
lender, which is
St =
Z 1
t
St e
−γ(s−t)e−
∫ s
t 
S
u du(Ps − Ls − V 0) ds; (8)
where St = F1fF+S(t)<((0;1])g is the intensity with which another lender is
located.
If the agents agree to transact now, then the lender receives Lt and the
borrower get his expected utility from shorting, Pt − Lt − V 0. Hence, the
gain from trade between these agents is
Lt + (Pt − Lt − V 0)−Lt − St = Gt − St;
where we have used Proposition 1, and where
Gt = Et(V ()
  > t) =
Z 1
t
Vue
−(u−t)γγ du; (9)
where Vt = V
(t)−V 0. Thus, if the lender has a fraction q of the bargaining
power,17 then the equilibrium lending fee for a loan in progress is
Lt = Lt + q(Gt − St): (10)
This is an equilibrium outcome of Nash (1950) bargaining, and can be jus-
tied by an alternating-oer game with risk of breakdown (Binmore, Rubin-
stein, and Wolinsky (1986)),18 or by a simultaneous-oer bargaining game
(Kreps (1990)).
17The bargaining power q need not be constant over time, but we take it so for simplicity
of exposition.
18We solve an explicit bargaining game over the total fees paid in expectation, L, but
we do not report it here. The numerical results imply a value for q that is almost constant
and very close to 0.5.
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Solving Equations (4) and (8), using (10), we get the following calcula-
tions.
Theorem 2 Suppose the lender has a fraction q of the bargaining power.
Then the expected present value Lt of the lending fee paid by the borrower to
a lender already contacted at time t is given by (10), where
St =
Z 1
t
(1− e−
∫ u
t (1−q)Sz dz)Vue−(u−t)γγ du (11)
Lt =
Z 1
t
e−γ(s−t)Ls q(Gs − Ss) ds; (12)
where Lt = U(S(t)) is the rate with which a lender nds a borrower. The
price Pt is given by Equation (7). Of all equilibria, the one given by q = 0
has the lowest lending fees (Lt = Lt = 0) and prices, while the one given by
q = 1 has the highest possible lending fees (Lt and Lt) and prices.19
Since the bargaining, as derived above, takes place over Lt, the literal
interpretation of Lt is a lump-sum lending fee paid if the lending arrangment
begins at time t, and is to continue until the day of reckoning. This lump-
sum payment, however, is consistent with continuous payments Rt. The rate
Rt, moreover, is \renegotiation proof," in the sense that a later bargaining
over lending fees will lead to no change in the path of R. One obtains Rt by
dierentiating 4, whence
L0t = −Rt + γLt; (13)
yielding
Rt = q(Gt − St)(Lt − (1− q)St ) + qγVt (14)
= q

(Lt + γ)(Gt − St)− (Gt − St)0
  0 : (15)
3.4 Characterizing the Prices and Lending Fees
In this section, we derive some properties of prices and lending fees that
apply in all of the equilibria that we have identied. First, we have some
natural time dynamics.
19These prices and lending fees are minimal and maximal, respectively, accross all pos-
sible equilibria, not just within the class of bargaining equilibria considered here.
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Proposition 3 For t <  , the expected future borrowing fees L(t) and L(t),
the price, P (t), and the volume of trade, S 0(t), are all decreasing in t. The
short interest S(t) is increasing in t. As t!1, it holds that L(t)! 0, and
Pt approaches the Walrasian price.
20
We turn to a characterization based on comparative statics. That is, we
compare the equilibrium properties of economies that are distinguished by
their parameters. We consider rst the dependence of lending fees on the
dierences of opinions between optimists and pessimists. We say (in the
sense of comparative statics) that there is an increased dierence of opinions
between optimists and pessimists if the pessimists’ valuation, V 0, decreases
and if the cross-sectional distribution of the optimists’ valuations increases
in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance (FOSD).
Proposition 4 With any increase in the dierence of opinions between op-
timists and pessimists, there is an increase in the lending fees, Lt and Lt.
With any increase (in the sense of FOSD) in the optimists’ valuations, hold-
ing constant the pessimists’ valuation V 0, the asset price Pt increases.
Increasing the float F has two eects. First, it increases the quantity of
agents who can hold the security, both directly, and indirectly by facilitating
a more rapid growth in the short interest. Hence, the marginal investor is
less optimistic with a larger float. Second, a larger float is associated with
a reduction in the expected number of times that a given share will be lent.
Both of these eects reduce the price and the expected lending fee, as stated
below. This result may partially address the influence of a small float on the
initial valuation of IPOs, xing the fundamentals and the total number of
shares outstanding,
Proposition 5 The price, Pt, and the lending fees, Lt and Lt, are decreasing
in the float, F , and increasing in the lender’s bargaining power, q.
Increasing the search intensity, , or increasing the initial quantity (0)
of would-be shorters, which we may think of as proportional to the amount of
capital available for shorting, decreases the valuation of the marginal investor,
pushing down the price and the lending fee. At the same time, however, it
increases the expected number of times that a given share can be lent, which
on its own would increase the lending fee and hence the price.
20The Walrasian price is the valuation of the marginal investor given the maximal
amount of shorting; see Appendix A.
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Proposition 6 The price, net of expected future lending fees, P − L, de-
creases with  and with (0), and increases with γ. The eects of , (0),
and γ on the price P and the expected lending fee L, separately, however, are
ambiguous.21
Precise statements can still be made regarding the behavior of the equi-
librium as parameters approach extreme values. Of particular interest is the
influence on the price of an increasingly liquid market for borrowing | that
is, as the meeting intensity  goes to innity.
Proposition 7 Suppose the lender’s bargaining power q is strictly less than
1. Then, as the search intensity  tends to innity, for all t, the expected
future lending fees Lt (at the time of a loan) and Lt (if searching for a loan
at time t) tend to zero, and the price Pt tends to the Walrasian price Wt.
22
The intuition behind this result is the following. If pessimists have some
bargaining power (q < 1) and there are not enough pessimists to absorb the
entire demand for the asset, then, as  gets large, the reservation values of
pessimists approach the total future fees from a lending agreement, because
they have a high chance of meeting another owner immediately. Since the
quantity of unlled shorts decreases rapidly toward zero, lenders are not
in the same situation. With a large quantity of pessimists, the marginal
investor’s valuation quickly becomes that of a pessimist, leaving no gains
from lending.
If, on the other hand, lenders have perfect bargaining power (q = 1), then,
as of time 0, the potential expected gain from lending an asset repeatedly
until the day of reckoning all accrue to the owner at time 0. This expected
gain is the expected number of times that the asset is expected to be lent,
multiplied by the dierence in valuation between the marginal investor and
the pessimist. In the limit as  gets large, the asset is lent the maximum
possible number of times,
 =
1
F
minf(0); ((0; 1])− Fg:
We can summarize this case as follows.
21By an \ambiguous" eect, we mean that there are parameters for which the eect is
positive, and other parameters for which the eect is negative.
22This is the price that obtains when there exist Walrasian markets for both trading
and borrowing the security; see Appendix A.
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Figure 1: The expected total lending fees, Lt.
Proposition 8 If the lender has all bargaining power (q = 1), then
lim
!1
L0 = (W0 − V 0)
lim
!1
P0 = W0 + (W0 − V 0):
Furthermore, for t > 0, in the limit as !1, we have Lt = 0 and Pt = Wt.
3.5 Numerical Example
We illustrate with an example. We assume that there is a mass (0) = 0:25
of pessimistic agents whose personal valuation of the asset is V 0 = 100, while
the valuations of the other agents, of total mass 2, are uniformly distributed
between V 0 and V 1 = 110. The total supply of the asset is F = 0:04, the
meeting intensity of agents is  = 1000, and the intensity of arrival of the
reckoning day is γ = 0:5. The gains from trade are split evenly (that is,
q = 0:5).
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Figure 2: The dependence of the asset price on time.
With this specication, the equilibrium can be solved explicitly. Figure 1
shows the expected present value of fees that an owner receives by (eventu-
ally) lending (that is, L). For the parameters chosen, this represents a price
premium at time 0 of approximately 0.6% associated with the opportunity
to lend the asset. (The maximal premium, for the case in which lenders have
all of the bargaining power, is about 50%.) This lending-fee price premium
decreases rapidly over time, to practically 0 within two months.
The price itself, depicted in Figure 2, drops over time as the expected
future value of lending opportunities declines, and as the expected marginal
valuation at the day of reckoning also declines with the introduction of more
and more shares from shortselling, \burning through" the pool of un-invested
optimists. The price decline is mostly due to the decline of the expected
lending fee.
Figure 3 illustrates the gradual build-up of the short interest, as a pro-
portion of the float. Finally, Figure 4 plots the price at time 0 as a function
of . One can notice both the non-monotonicity of the price as well as its
eventual convergence to its smallest possible value, the Walrasian one.
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Figure 3: The dependence of the short interest on time.
3.6 The Equilibrium Amount of Shorting Capital
Now we consider the endogenous determination of the amount of capital
that is made available for shorting. We assume that there is some xed
frictional cost, c, of shorting (in addition to the lending fees). Only agents
who have incurred this cost are in a position to search for opportunities to
borrow shares. The value St to a pessimist of acquiring this ability, in the
equilibrium of Section 3.3, is characterized as follows.
Proposition 9 At any time t <  , the expected value, St, to a pessimist
associated with the opportunity to be a shorter (i) decreases with t, (ii) is
decreasing and continuous in the quantity, (0), of pessimists, and (iii) tends
to 0 as (0) increases to innity. If the marginal-type function (  ) dened
by (1) is strictly decreasing23 at 0, then S0 is strictly decreasing in (0).
23This means that there exists no  > 0 such that () = limS!0 (S). If this is not
the case, then we obtain the weaker result that S0 is constant for (0) in a set [0; ] with
 > 0, and strictly decreasing for (0) > . (For this, it suces that the distribution of
types has a positive density.)
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Figure 4: Dependence of the price on the borrower-lender search intensity.
This result provides for a determinate endogenous level of capital for
shorting, in the following sense. Suppose there is an unlimited pool of pes-
simists that consider the opportunity to incur the \entry cost" c. At time 0,
given the properties stated by the proposition and provided that c is strictly
less than the benet level S0 associated with no pessimists ((0) = 0), there
is a unique quantity (0) of pessimists that actively seek short positions with
the property that the benet S0 precisely justies the cost c. In equilibrium
(of the entry game that we do not formally model here), this quantity (0)
of pessimists enters, and is indierent to doing so, because S0 = c. As the
benet St decreases with t, those entering at time 0 correctly anticipate that
there is no subsequent entry. With this equilibrium entry of pessimists, no
optimist would short, as the expected prot to an optimist from shorting is
smaller than that of a pessimist, who in equilibrium is indierent to entering.
Thus, as anticipated with our initial model, only type-0 agents would
choose to shortsell under these conditions. The expected prot from shorting
depends on the dierences of opinions, as stated below.
Proposition 10 The equilibrium amount, (0), of capital available for short-
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ing increases with an increase in the dierence of opinions between optimists
and pessimists.
The quantity (0) of those actively seeking short positions depends am-
biguously on other model parameters. For instance, a decrease in the float F
leads to a higher valuation by the marginal investor, making shorting more
attractive, but also makes it harder to nd shares to short.
If there were a limited pool of pessimists, agents of dierent valuation
types would acquire the ability to short. Of these, relatively more optimistic
shorters would wait until the price declines suciently to justify closing their
short positions and forming long positions instead. We have avoided the
calculation of an equilibrium for this, more complicated, situation.
3.7 Delayed Settlement
We have so far assumed instantaneous settlement of trades. In many mar-
kets, however, settlement occurs with a lag. In most U.S. equity markets, for
instance, settlement is \T + 3," meaning 3 days after the transaction date,
while the market for securities lending is normally based on same-day set-
tlement. Thus, the \spot market" for equities is, in eect, actually a 3-day
forward market. It follows that if X sells a share to Y today, then Y could
not begin lending the share until 3 days from now. Settlement lags reduce
the rate at which short interest can build up.
In this section, we present a simple extension of our model that captures
the notion of delayed settlement. We denote the settlement lag by . We
assume for simplicity that when a share is sold, but has not yet been delivered,
it is not available for lending to anyone. In the example above, this means
that, during the settlement period, neither X nor Y may not lend the share
sold to Y.
With a settlement lag, the number of shares (potentially) available for
lending is a time-varying process, which we denote by A. The basic ordinary
dierential equation (2) determining the short interest S(t) is now replaced
by the system of equations24
S 0(t) = A(t)U(S(t))1fF+S(t)<((0;1])g (16)
A0(t) = −S 0(t) + S 0(t− ); (17)
24At t = 0, the derivatives involved are derivatives from the right.
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the second of which reflects the fact that the quantity A(t) shares available
for shorting is reduced by the current volume of shorting and increased by
newly delivered shares (those that were borrowed and sold  units of time
ago).
With delayed settlement, our model captures a sense in which a security
can become harder to locate. A shorter locates a share with intensity A(t),
which is low if the number, A(t), of shares available for shorting is low. This
happens, for instance, if there is a large number of agents who want to short,
or if there is a long settlement period. (The model can, indeed, produce
cyclical variation in the number of shares available for shorting.)
Proposition 11 An increase in the settlement lag  causes a reduction in
the short interest S(t) for all t.
The expected lending fee for a prospective loan, for an agent buying a
security at time t with a settlement delay of , is e−γLt+, where L is dened
by (4). As a consequence, the price is
Pt = e
−γLt+ +
Z 1
t
V (u)e−(u−t)γγ du; (18)
modifying Proposition 1. One can separately compute the price and the
lending fee in light of delayed settlement, solving the bargaining game with
an arbitrary sharing of bargaining power.25
We demonstrate the quantitive eect of delayed settlement by extending
the example considered previously. We assume a settlement lag of  = 0:01
(approximately 2.5 working days). Figure 5 shows the price, with both in-
stantaneous and delayed settlement. For the parameters chosen, delayed
settlement results in a higher present value of the opportunity to lending. In
fact, the initial price is even higher than the private valuation of the most
optimistic agent.
25With delayed settlement, the gain from trade is Gt − St − (Lt − e−γLt+). Thus,
Lt = Lt + q(Gt − St − (Lt − e−γLt+));
and L and S satsify the dierential equations:
S0t = −(1− q)St
(
Gt − St − (Lt − e−γLt+)

+ γSt
L0t = −qLt
(
Gt − St − (Lt − e−γLt+)

+ γLt;
where Lt = U(S(t)) and 
S
t = At.
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Figure 5: Price with both delayed and instantaneous settlement
4 Example: Equity Carve-Outs
The \strange" behavior of the prices of certain equity carve-outs has received
recent attention (Lamont and Thaler (2001), Mitchell, Pulvino, and Staord
(2001), Ofek and Richardson (2001)). For instance, 3Com, which owned
Palm, made an initial public oering of 5% of Palm shares on March 2,
2000, and promised to later distribute the remaining Palm shares to 3Com
shareholders (conditional on IRS approval). The \stub" value of 3Com, its
total market valuation net of the market value of its holdings of Palm, became
negative shortly after the Palm issue! This is, at least supercially, at odds
with the absence of arbitrage and the limited liability of equities. We now
illustrate how our modeling approach allows for the possibility of negative
stub values, with no arbitrage and with optimizing agents.
We adopt the following stylized model. Firm A consists of two sub-
sidiaries, B and C. The holding rm A and its subsidiary B are traded on an
exchange. We assume for simplicity that each investor can buy or shortsell
at most one share of A and of B, and that there exist a unit mass of shares
of both A and B, and the same floats for A and B. Hence, we can use the
24
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Figure 6: Short interest with both delayed and instantaneous settlement
model of Section 3 both for A and for B. The personal valuations of A, B, and
C of an agent of type  are denoted by V A;, V B;, and V C;, respectively,
and are assumed to be non-negative and satisfy V A; = V B; + V C;. We
are interested in the price pA of A, the price pB of B, and the stub value,
pA − pB.
Suppose, rst, that all agents agree on the valuation of C, in that V C; =
V C for all . In this case, if the two markets work identically, meaning that
 and q for A are the same as the corresponding parameters for B, then the
stub value is, naturally, pA − pB = V C  0.
A negative stub value can arise, however, under certain (rather special)
circumstances. For instance, suppose there are two groups of agents, one of
which is optimistic about B and pessimistic about C, relative to the other
group. For a numerical example, suppose the investors of Group 1 have ex-
pected valuations of B and C of 85 and 15, respectively. Group-2 investors
have expected valuations of B and C of 70 and 30, respectively. All agents
thus agree on a valuation of 100 for the holding rm A, which is its equilib-
rium price. Group-1 agents buy the shares of B; Group-2 agents attempt to
25
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Figure 7: The stub value, initially negative, becomes positive.
short the shares of B. With a contact intensity of  = 40, F = 0:5, masses
20 of Group-1 investors and 10 of Group-2 investors, an arrival intensity of
γ = 5 for the time at which the valuations of B and C are revealed, and
equal borrower-lender bargaining power (q = 0:5), our results imply that the
market price of B at time 0 is 125.
Figure 7 shows that, as the short interest builds up, the stub value in-
creases and eventually turns positive. This pattern is consistent with the
empirical observations of Lamont and Thaler (2001) and Mitchell, Pulvino,
and Staord (2001).
This example shows that a negative stub value is not necessarily incon-
sistent with optimizing behavior by all agents, contrary to the argument for
irrationality proposed by Lamont and Thaler (2001), who write: \It is always
true that someone has to own the shares issued by the rm; not all buyers
can lend their shares." In our model, an inability of would-be borrowers and
lenders of stock to instantly locate each other implies that rational agents
may indeed pay a price that is inflated by lending fees and not lend right
away. Whether lending fees, in practice, are large enough to justify observed
prices is dicult to assess directly, because of the stylized nature of our
26
model and because of diculties in measuring agents’ private valuations. In
the case of the spino of Palm by 3Com, Lamont and Thaler (2001) note
that, after the rst day of trading of Palm (when locating lendable shares of
Palm would presumably have been comparatively dicult), the implied stub
value of 3Com was minus $60.78 per share! D’Avolio (2001) reports that
the annualized lending fee for Palm stock was on the order of 40%. (Similar
rates for Palm are noted by Mitchell, Pulvino, and Staord (2001).) The
float, only 3% of outstanding shares, was relatively small. These facts point
to a shortage of immediately lendable shares relative to the likely amount of
shorting capital. In another case involving a negative stub value, for Stratos
Lightwave, Reed (2001) reports an annualized lending fee of approximately
45%.
5 Concluding Remarks
While our results point to price declines during periods over which short in-
terest is building up, we have not directly modeled the associated impact on
expected returns, as that would call for identifying a reference set of prob-
ability assessments. As far as optimists are concerned, these price declines
are acceptable in light of lending fees and the likelihood that they assign to
eventual positive price jumps. A case for \inferior expected returns" during
the period immediately following IPOs, for example, is more easily made
with our model if one adopts the probability assessments of pessimists, or if
one simply assumes that optimists are irrationally optimistic.
The model we have presented could be adapted to address more speci-
cally such issues as (i) the behavior of prices of equities that have recently
had an initial public oering, (ii) repo specials and the associated valuation
of government bonds, and (iii) \bubbles." For these purposes, one might con-
sider extensions of our model that incorporate partial information revelation
over time, the updating (and perhaps convergence) of beliefs, disagreement
among agents over the implications of new pieces of information, hedging
motives for shorting, and fluctuations in the float and in the ease with which
agents of various types are located.
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A Appendix: Walras Equilibrium
In this section we derive, as a benchmark, the prices and lending fees in an
economy with a shorting-through-securities-lending institution, but with no
search frictions. To be constistent with Section 3, we assume that agents can
be long or short at most one share, and that only type-0 agents can short.
(If everyone can shortsell, the analysis is analogous.) The equilibrium price
in this model is called the \Walrasian price."
At any time, an agent can instantly buy or shortsell shares, and can also
lend or borrow shares. In order to shortsell x shares, an agent must borrow
at least x shares. To lend x shares, an agent must own at least x shares.
Let x() be the (signed) number of shares owned by an agent of type .
Then, in a Walrasian equilibrium with a positive lending fee, a type- agent is
lending (borrowing, if negative) x() shares. This is because an agent with a
long position optimally lends all his shares, and an agent with a short position
optimally borrows just the number of shares he needs. Hence, equilibrium
in the securities market implies market clearing, in that
R
x()(d) = F .
Equilibrium, and thus market clearing, in the lending market implies thatR
x()(d) = 0. Thus, in the absence of frictions, there is no equilibrium
with positive lending fees if the float is positive.
Consequently, the Walrasian price at any time t is the valuation of the
marginal investor at that time, as characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 12 Suppose that the float is positive (F > 0). Then, at any
time t, the unique Walrasian lending fee is zero, and the essentially26 unique
Walrasian price is
Wt =
8<
:
V 0 if F + (0) > ((0; 1]) and t < 
V ¯((0)) if F + (0) < ((0; 1]) and t < 
V if t   :
(A.1)
B Appendix: Proofs
The proof of Proposition 1 is in the body of the text.
26If the marginal investor, ((0)), is not unique then there is an interval of equilibrium
prices; see (1). The set of values for (0) with this property has Lebesgue measure zero.
28
Proof of Theorem 2:
Since S solves the linear ODE
_St = −St (Pt − Lt − V 0) + (γ + St )St
= −S(1− q)Gt + (γ + (1− q)St )St;
we have
St =
Z 1
t
e−γ(s−t)e(1−q)
∫ s
t
Sz dz(1− q)SGs ds; (B.1)
which is equal to (11) (integration by parts).
Using (4) and (10) we see that L solves
_Lt = −Lt q(Gt − St) + γLt; (B.2)
with the solution given by (12).
The optimist will never accept a negative lending fee, whence 0 (obtained
when q = 0) is the minimal lending fee. To see that q = 1 yields the maximal
fees, note that Pt − V 0  Lt is a necessary condition for the pessimist to be
willing to borrow, a condition which implies that Lt − Lt  Gt, whence
_Lt  −Lt Gt + γLt:
Now apply Gronwall’s inequality to infer that
Lt 
Z 1
t
Z s
t
Ludu Vse
−γ(s−t)γds;
which is the expression for Lt corresponding to q = 1. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3:
We rst show that G(t)− S(t) is decreasing in t. This follows from the fact
that Vt is decreasing in t and from
Gt − St =
Z 1
t
e−(1−q)
∫ u
t
Sz dzVue
−(u−t)γγ du (B.3)
=
Z 1
0
e−(1−q)FuVt+ue−γuγ du; (B.4)
which is seen to be true because 1fF+S(t)<((0;1])g = 0 implies that Vt = 0.
Using this and similar arguments one shows that L(t), L(t), and P (t) decrease
in t.
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It is clear from (2) that S(t) is increasing and that S 0(t) is decreasing. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4:
If there is an increase in the dierence of opinion between optimists and
pessimists, then Vt increases for all t. Hence, from (B.4), Gt−St increases.
This implies that L and L increase.
If the dierence of opinions increases, keeping V 0 constant, then V (t)
increases for all t. Then, Proposition 1 shows that Pt increases. ¤
Proof of Proposition 5:
Increasing the float increases St for all t, which decreases V
(t), Vt, and 
L
t .
Hence, using (B.4), Gt − St decreases. Using (12), we see that Lt decreases.
Finally, Pt is seen to decrease using Proposition 1.
It is obvious that Gt−St increases in q, and all the statements about the
impact of q follow immedtiately. ¤
Proof of Proposition 6:
Increasing  and (0) increases St for all t, which decreases V
(t). Hence,
the results follow from (7). ¤
Proof of Proposition 7:
From (B.4), it follows by dominated convergence that Gt−St ! 0 as !1,
for all t. Note now that
L0  (G0 − S0)
Z 1
0
Lt dt;
where the integral is the expected number of times a given asset is lent, which
is nite (in fact, it equals  as dened in the text). The statements about
Lt and Pt follow immediately. ¤
Proof of Proposition 8:
When q = 1 we have S = 0, and the limit of Gt is V1. All the statements
are immediate. ¤
Proof of Proposition 9:
It is clear from (11) that St decreases in t. We next show that St approaches
zero as (0) approaches innity. For (0) > ((0; 1])− F , we let T ((0)) =
infft : F + S(t) = ((0; 1])g. From (2), we see that T ((0))! 0 as (0)!
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1. Now, since Vt = 0 for t  T ((0)), we see from (11) that St ! 0 as
(0)!1 for all t  0.
Inspection of (11) reveals that Vu is the only term depending on (0).
We note that V (u) = V ¯(S(u)) is a decreasing and right-continuous function
of S(u) which, in turn, is an increasing and continuous function of u and
(0). Let k(u) = (1− e−(1−q)Fu)e−uγγ, f be the function dened by V (u) =
f(F+S(u)), and g(u; (0)) = F+S(u; (0)), using obvious notation from this
point to indicate dependence on (0). Let h be dened by h(u) = g(u; 0).
For any T > 0 (suciently large) and  (suciently small) let u1 and u2
satisfy by h(u1) = A, respectively h(T − u2) = T −A, where A is the
modulus of continuity of g(u; ) as a function of , uniformly in u. Note that
S(0; 0)− S(0; 0 +)
=
Z 1
0
k(u) (f(g(u; 0))− f(g(u; 0 +))) du

Z 1
0
k(u) (f(g(u; 0))− f(g(u; 0) + A)) du
=
Z u1
0
k(u)f(h(u))du+
Z T
u1
f(h(u))
(
k(u)− k(h−1(h(u)− A)) du−
Z T
T−u2
k(u)f(h(u) + A)du+
Z 1
T
k(u) (f(g(u; 0))− f(g(u; 0 +))) du:
(The inequality owes to the monotonicity of f .)
Choosing T large enough will make the last term arbitrarily small. A small
enough  combined with continuity makes the other three terms arbitrarily
small. Consequently, S(0) is continuous in (0), and so is S(t), by essentially
the same proof.
Given that Vu is right-continuous in (0), S(0) is strictly decreasing in
(0) if and only if there exists u for which Vu decreases strictly in (0).
Note rst that, if Vu(0) decreases in (0), then, for any 
0
0 > 0, dening
u0 so that Vu(0) = Vu′(00); implies that Vu′(
0
0) increases in (0) at
00. Second, note that, if  decreases strictly around 0, then Vu decreases
around (0) = 0. ¤
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Proof of Proposition 10:
Increasing the dierence of opinions increases Vt for all t, which increases
S, as is seen from (11). ¤
Proof of Proposition 11:
It suces to consider only times t for which F+St < ((0; 1]). Note from (16)
and (17) that
S 0(t) = (F + S(t− )− S(t))((0)− S(t));
under the assumptions that St = 0 for all t  0 and A0 = F .
Let now 1 < 2 and note that S1(t) = S2(t) for t  1, and that
S 01(1) = S
0
2
(1) and S
00
1
(1) > S
00
2
(1), where S
00 denotes the second deriva-
tive from the right (that is, the derivative from the right of S 0). The latter
two relations imply that, for t > 1 suciently close to 1, S1(t) > S2(t).
Assume, in order to get a contradiction, that the (closed) set ft > 1 :
S1(t) = S2(t)g is not empty and let t0 be its smallest element. Then,
S 01(t0) > S
0
2
(t0), since S1(t− 1) > S1(t− 2)  S2(t− 2), contradicting
the denition of t0. ¤
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